OMB Involvement in FDA Drug Regulations: Regulating the Regulators by O\u27Connor, Kathleen M.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 38 
Issue 1 Fall 1988 Article 8 
1988 
OMB Involvement in FDA Drug Regulations: Regulating the 
Regulators 
Kathleen M. O'Connor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Kathleen M. O'Connor, OMB Involvement in FDA Drug Regulations: Regulating the Regulators, 38 Cath. U. 
L. Rev. 175 (1989). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/8 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
COMMENT
OMB INVOLVEMENT IN FDA DRUG
REGULATIONS: REGULATING
THE REGULATORS
The Nuremberg Code sets forth the first universal principles of medical
ethics governing experimentation on human beings.1 The primary objective
of the Code is to ensure that clinical researchers use the utmost care in pro-
tecting the rights and welfare of human test subjects.2 A modem adaptation
of the Code for contemporary clinical research counsels that the three basic
principles which should govern medical experimentation on humans are re-
spect, justice and beneficence. 3
1. The ten principles now known as the Nuremberg Code were set forth in the judgment
at the Nuremberg trials. United States v. Brandt, 2 TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 at 181, re-
printed in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 305 (1972). The ten principles
outline the moral and ethical obligations that the scientist must meet before commencing re-
search on human beings. These principles include the obligation of the researcher to obtain
the voluntary and informed consent of the human test subject; to insure that the subject has
the freedom to terminate the experiment at any stage if the subject is not physically or men-
tally capable of continuing; to insure that the experiment is necessary, is based on results of
animal experimentation, and is designed to produce results which are beneficial to society; to
conduct the experiment in such a way as to minimize risk to the human subject; and to insure
that the experiment is conducted by highly qualified scientists who exercise good judgment in
the continual monitoring of the experiment. Id.
2. In Brandt the Nuremberg military tribunal wrote:
The great weight of the evidence before us is to the effect that certain types of medi-
cal experiments on human beings, when kept within reasonably well-defined bounds,
conform to the ethics of the medical profession generally. The protagonists of the
practice of human experimentation justify their views on the basis that such experi-
ments yield results for the good of society that are unprocurable by other methods or
means of study. All agree, however, that [the principles set forth in the Nuremberg
Code] must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts ....
Id.
3. Thus, researchers must treat patients with respect, fairness, and with consideration
toward promoting the well-being of individuals and society. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, SUMMING UP: FINAL REPORT ON STUDIES OF THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 66-71 (1983)
[hereinafter SUMMING UP]; R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
11-17 (2d ed. 1986).
Treating patients with respect means giving patients information about alternative health
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Historically, United States laws regulating experimental research on
human beings have emulated the principles set forth in the Nuremberg
Code.4 The dominant area of research involving the use of human test sub-
jects in the United States is drug research. The Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), which regulates the drug industry, was the first federal agency
to establish rules governing private sector use of human beings as research
subjects.5 Like the Nuremberg Code, the FDA regulations seek to protect
care choices, honoring those choices where possible, protecting the privacy rights of patients,
and ensuring that researchers are not required to act contrary to their values. See SUMMING
Up, supra, at 68.
The principle of justice incorporates the concern that researchers treat patients in a fair and
non-arbitrary manner. Id. at 70-71. Although in certain situations equity may require that
researchers treat patients identically, other situations may require that patients be treated
fairly. For example, health professionals must apply a uniform standard of death to all pa-
tients, but all patients are not equally entitled to scarce biomedical resources. Id. Justice
requires that burdens and benefits be shared fairly and that distribution of benefits and burdens
be based on morally sound criteria. See R. LEVINE, supra, at 17-18.
The principle of promoting well-being requires researchers to make all decisions in consider-
ation of promoting the health and welfare of the patient, while considering the welfare of
others, including the patient's family and future patients, who may benefit from knowledge
gained from research. Id. at 67. "The principle of well-being also commands that the interests
of incompetent patients be protected, according to the standards that a reasonable person
would apply under the circumstances in weighing potential benefits and risks." SUMMING UP,
supra, at 67.
4. Prior to the 1960s, the United States had very few laws governing medical research.
See Curran, Governmental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The
Approach of TWo Federal Agencies, 98 DAEDALUS 542, 542-45 (1969). Under the auspices of
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (predecessor to the present De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS)), the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published the first federal guidelines for the ethical
conduct of experimentation on humans. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEL-
FARE, 94TH CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL REGULATION OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, CRS-
12 (Comm. Print 1975) (prepared by Staff of Science Policy Research Div. of Congressional
Research Service) [hereinafter EXPERIMENTATION REPORT]. Although the NIH published
guidelines in 1953 for research conducted at its Clinical Research Center in Bethesda, Mary-
land, these guidelines did not cover NIH-sponsored human experimentation at other locations.
See Curran, supra, at 574-76. The Surgeon General subsequently published guidelines for
NIH intramural research programs, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION, AND WELFARE, PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT, (May
1, 1969), reprinted in EXPERIMENTATION REPORT, supra, at CRS-93, and the HEW codified
regulations for HEW-sponsored research. Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914
(1974).
In 1963, the FDA published regulations governing drug research on humans conducted at
all public and private facilities. Procedural and Interpretive Regulations; Investigational Use,
28 Fed. Reg. 179 (1963) (current version at 21 CFR pt. 312) (hereinafter First Investigational
Drug Regs.]. Both the FDA and HEW regulations provided for periodic ethical review of
research involving human subjects, measuring the risks and benefits of the research, and ob-
taining the informed consent of the research subject.
5. Although the NIH issued the first guidelines governing research on human subjects,
see supra note 4, these guidelines did not extend to research conducted by private clinics or
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the rights and welfare of human test subjects by ensuring that the research is
necessary, justified, and based on sound risk-benefit analysis.6
For over two decades, the FDA has carefully protected the rights of per-
sons involved in experimental drug testing. Two regulatory provisions
which have remained constant since the FDA first published regulations in
1963 are the requirements that both the evidentiary burden of proving the
safety and effectiveness of the experimental drug and the economic burden of
incurring the cost of drug development remain on the drug manufacturer.7
In the spring of 1987, however, the FDA published a proposal that would
allow pharmaceutical companies to sell experimental drugs to terminally ill
patients with practically no supervision from the FDA.8 The proposal not
only allowed the drug company to shift a portion of its economic burden to
hospitals. Id. In 1963, the FDA published the first guidelines regulating private clinical re-
search. First Investigational Drug Regs., supra note 4, at 179. Although the FDA's primary
objective in drafting the regulations was to establish procedures for testing and approving new
drugs, the regulations generally reflected the principles of the Nuremberg Code. See Curran,
supra note 4, at 561-70. The regulations directed the drug manufacturer to provide the FDA
with information regarding the nature of the experimental drug, the design of the clinical trial,
and the training and experience of the persons conducting the research. First Investigational
Drug Regs., supra note 4, at 179-80. Although the regulations directed that research could not
proceed until the manufacturer had secured the consent of human research subjects, the FDA
did not elaborate on either the procedures for obtaining such consent or the adequacy of such
consent. See id. at 181. Thus, in 1966, the FDA published a formal statement detailing the
nature and adequacy of the consent required of humans involved in experimental drug trials.
Consent for Use of Investigational New Drugs on Humans; Statement of Policy, 31 Fed. Reg.
11,415 (1966). The FDA's most recent revision of its investigational drug regulations requires
the clinical investigator to comply with FDA regulations governing the protection of human
subjects and the ethical review of clinical trials. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.53(g)(vii), 312.60 (1988).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41. In addition, the FDA regulations command
that only qualified researchers conduct the clinical investigations and that the researchers ob-
tain the informed consent of the human subject before commencing any research. Id.
7. Since the FDA first published investigational drug regulations in 1963, the burden has
rested on the drug sponsor to justify the use of an experimental drug in clinical trials and
ultimately to produce evidence that the drug is sufficiently safe and effective for marketing to
the general public. See First Investigational Drug Regs., supra note 4, at 179. Although the
regulations did not contain a blanket ban on the sale of investigational drugs, the FDA re-
quired a drug manufacturer seeking FDA permission to sell an investigational drug to justify
the sale to the FDA. Id. at 180. This provision effectively compelled the drug manufacturer to
shoulder the cost of drug development while the drug was under investigation. Once the FDA
approved the drug, the manufacturer could recoup development costs.
The requirement that the drug manufacturer bear both the evidentiary burden of showing
the safety and effectiveness of a drug and the financial burden of incurring development costs
remained constant in the FDA regulations through 1986. See New Drugs for Investigational
Use, 39 Fed. Reg. 11712 (1974) (current version at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312 (1988)).
8. The proposal was actually a reproposed section of a larger proposal to streamline
regulations of the development and testing of new drugs. See infra text accompanying notes
124-27.
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its human test subject,9 but also allowed the company to shift its evidentiary
burden to the FDA.' ° While the former provision ran contrary to historical
FDA regulations," the latter contradicted the agency's enabling act.12
Not surprisingly, the FDA proposal was the product of a convergence of
forces which influenced the agency's rulemaking activity. First, public
awareness of a lag in drug development caused by stringent regulations fu-
eled pleas from terminally ill patients for early access to promising new
drugs.13 Second, the Reagan administration, through the White House Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB), pushed its agenda of deregulation
onto all administrative agencies,' 4 specifically targeting the FDA investiga-
tional drug regulations for major change.' 5 Third, a growing population of
persons with AIDS increased the pressure on the FDA to relax restrictions
on access to investigational drugs.' 6
During the past decade, OMB has risen to a powerful position in the
agency rulemaking process. Pursuant to two executive orders,' 7 President
Reagan has charged OMB with the task of reviewing all agency rules for
consistency with his deregulatory agenda. Commentators have questioned
both the authority for and the wisdom of the President's decision to grant
9. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 141-45.
11. The first FDA regulations governing the use of experimental drugs in clinical trials
contained a provision requiring drug sponsors seeking to sell investigational drugs during
clinical trials to provide to the FDA "a full explanation why sale is required and should not be
regarded as the commercialization of a new drug for which an application is not approved."
First Investigational Regs., supra note 4, at 180. This provision, which effectively precluded
the sale of investigational drugs, remained constant in FDA regulations of treatment use and
sale of investigational drugs until the publication of the new rule which is the subject of this
Comment.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 146-47.
13. See infra text accomanying notes 55-63.
14. See OMB WATCH, THROUGH THE CORRIDORS OF POWER 11-12 (1987).
15. In its annual regulatory reform report, OMB tracks federal agency regulatory activity.
In its 1985-86 report, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) stated that
certain FDA "classic" health and safety regulations "can be unnecessarily burdensome [and]
interfere with consumer choices ...." EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT: APRIL 1, 1985 - MARCH 31, 1986, at 73. In its 1987-88 report, OMB stated that the
FDA regulatory reform program is "[d]esigned to prepare FDA for the challenges of today
and of the 21st century." EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: APRIL 1,
1987 - MARCH 31, 1988, at 87; see also infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
17. President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1982) [hereinafter First Reagan Order], in 1981, and Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50
Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter Second Rea-
gan Order], in 1985.
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such power to OMB." s Moreover, the manner in which OMB has imple-
mented the two executive orders has caused even greater concern. 9 While
the President may legitimately desire to coordinate national regulatory pol-
icy, the history of the FDA's new rule on the treatment use and sale of
investigational drugs evidences the danger of allowing a small, non-expert
staff at OMB to set the national agenda for drug regulations.
This Comment will explore the history of the FDA's proposed investiga-
tional drug rule and OMB's involvement in the rule. First, the Comment
will set forth a brief history of the FDA and its regulations governing the
drug development process. Next, the Comment will consider criticisms of
the drug approval process and the mounting pressures on the FDA to revise
its drug approval regulations. Third, the Comment will examine the emer-
gence of OMB into the regulatory arena, its accelerated rise under the Rea-
gan administration, and criticisms of OMB's involvement in the agency
rulemaking process. The Comment will then explore and analyze OMB's
role in the FDA's promulgation of the new rule allowing early access to
investigational drugs. Finally, the Comment will discuss the implications of
OMB's involvement in the FDA's promulgation of drug regulations and,
more specifically, the dangers of allowing OMB to regulate federal
regulators.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FDA
A. Statutory History
Congress created the FDA to protect the public from unsafe drugs. The
first act authorizing the FDA to regulate the drug market was the Federal
Food and Drug Act of 1906.2' This act authorized the FDA to recall a
misbranded or adulterated drug only after the drug manufacturer had intro-
duced the drug into the stream of commerce.2' In an effort to broaden the
regulatory authority of the FDA, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (the Act).22 The Act created a passive approval
process whereby the FDA would automatically approve a new drug for mar-
keting unless the FDA could show that the drug was unsafe for public
consumption.2 a
18. See infra text accompanying notes 104-12.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 113-23.
20. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (also known as the Wiley or Heyburn Act), repealed in part by
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982)).
21. Id.
22. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982)).
23. Id. Under the passive approval process, a drug manufacturer submitted a request to
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
In 1962, after the Thalidomide tragedy in Europe,24 Congress amended
the Act, requiring drug manufacturers to prove that a new drug is suffi-
ciently safe and effective for intended patient populations before receiving
FDA approval.25 Congress thus shifted the burden of proving the safety and
effectiveness of a new drug from the FDA to the drug manufacturer (the
sponsor).26
Congress further instructed the FDA to promulgate regulations permit-
ting drug sponsors to ship investigational drugs to hospitals and clinics for
the sole purpose of testing the drug in clinical studies. 2" The amended Act
permits only a qualified expert (the investigator) to conduct such studies and
requires the investigator to obtain the informed consent of human test sub-
the FDA to market a new drug. The FDA had no authority to deny the request unless the
FDA could produce evidence that the drug was unsafe. Thus, the burden of showing that a
new drug was not safe was placed on the FDA.
24. In 1961 and 1962, the treatment of pregnant women in Europe with Thalidomide
resulted in the births of several thousand infants with defective limbs. Roberts &
Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure, 1982
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 584. Although the FDA never approved Thalidomide for marketing in the
U.S., 2.5 million tablets of the drug were distributed to 1267 investigators. S. REP. No. 1153,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-25 (1966), reprinted in J. KATZ, supra note 1, at 921.
25. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 332, 348, 351-53, 355, 357-60, 372, 374, 376, 381 (1982)) [hereinafter
Drug Amendments]. Beginning in 1959, Senator Estes Kefauver initiated hearings on the
Drug Amendments for the primary purpose of investigating profits and pricing in the drug
industry. EXPERIMENTATION REPORT, supra note 4, at CRS-15. During the course of the
hearings, the Thalidomide tragedy occurred, shifting the central focus of the hearings from
economic issues to the safety and effectiveness of drugs on the U.S. market. See id. at CRS-15-
16. Thus, the Drug Amendments originated in the Senate subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly. See 108 CONG. REC. 22,037 (1962), reprinted in 23 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC AcT 188 (1979). The Senate Judiciary Committee subsequently
revised the bill. Id. After the Thalidomide tragedy in Europe, President Kennedy urged
James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee to strengthen the bill by giving
the FDA greater authority to regulate the drug development process. Id. The final bill con-
tained strong measures to enhance standards of drug manufacturing, to ensure the accuracy of
drug advertising, and to empower the FDA to approve only those drugs which the manufac-
turer has shown to be both safe and effective. Id. at 22,041, reprinted in 23 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FOOD, DRUG & COSMETIC AcT 192 (1979).
26. Section 355 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (the Act) now requires a
drug manufacturer to submit "full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use." 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(1) (1982). Before the FDA will approve the new drug for marketing, the drug manu-
facturer must submit "substantial evidence," id. § 355(d), to the FDA to show "whether or
not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use." Id. § 355(b)(1); see
also infra note 29. The FDA may also deny the request if test results are inadequate to show
that the drug is safe, 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1), if the drug is manufactured under unsafe condi-
tions, id. § 355(d)(3), if the FDA has independent evidence that the drug is unsafe, id.
§ 355(d)(4), or if the proposed labeling is false or misleading. Id. § 355(d)(6).
27. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i).
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jects before beginning the study.2" The amended Act suggests that the FDA
should approve clinical studies of new drugs only if the drug's sponsor sub-
mits drug research results to the FDA showing that drug research on ani-
mals justifies commencing drug tests on human beings.29 By carving out a
narrow and guarded investigational drug exemption to the prohibition
against distributing unapproved new drugs, Congress intended to place the
burden of justifying clinical studies, and subsequently proving the safety and
effectiveness of a new drug, on the drug sponsor.3 °
B. Development of FDA Drug Regulations
In 1963, shortly after Congress passed the Drug Amendments,31 the FDA
published a set of new drug regulations creating an investigational new drug
application (IND) and a new drug application (NDA).32 The regulations
require a drug sponsor to file an IND to obtain FDA approval before testing
an investigational drug on human subjects. 33 After completing clinical tri-
als, the sponsor must file an NDA to obtain FDA approval before distribut-
ing and marketing the new drug.34 The FDA may deny either application.
The section of the amended Act authorizing clinical drug research on
28. Id.
29. The amended Act states that the FDA may use its discretion in promulgating regula-
tions which require drug manufacturers seeking FDA approval to begin testing investigational
drugs on humans, and suggests that the FDA require such manufacturers to submit "reports,
by the manufacturer or the sponsor of the investigation of such drug, of preclinical tests (in-
cluding tests on animals) of such drug adequate to justify the proposed clinical testing" before
the commencement of any investigation. Id. § 355(i)(1).
30. One commentator, discussing the Drug Amendments, remarked:
As may well be imagined, there was opposition to the requirement that manufactur-
ers prove the efficacy of their drugs. This meant a fundamental change in the philos-
ophy of public regulation of the drug industry. From a policeman of safety, the FDA
was transformed into an arbiter of value, quality, and success in scientific
achievement.
Curran, supra note 4, at 552.
31. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
32. The FDA published the investigational new drug application (IND) regulations on
January 8, 1963, First Investigational Drug Regs., supra note 4, at 179, and the new drug
application (NDA) regulations on June 20, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 6375 (1963) (current version at
21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (1988)).
33. The IND regulations set forth the information that the FDA requires of the drug
sponsor prior to commencement of drug testing on humans. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1988). The
sponsor must justify the clinical trials by producing results of preclinical trials. Id. The spon-
sor must also set forth the exact nature of the trials, the names and qualifications of the investi-
gators performing the research, the expected results of the trials, and the expected duration of
the trials. Id.
34. Id. § 314. The NDA regulations set forth the information which the drug sponsor
must submit to the FDA in order to obtain marketing approval for the new drug. Id.
1988]
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humans35 incorporates the ethical principles found in the Nuremberg Code.
The amended Act requires that the sponsor must justify the research with
results of prior animal studies,36 that only expert investigators conduct the
research, a7 and that the investigator obtain the prior informed consent of
each human test subject.31
The IND regulations also incorporate the Nuremberg Code's ethical prin-
ciples. The regulations charge the sponsor with the responsibility of select-
ing qualified investigators, monitoring the progress of the clinical trials, and
ensuring that the trials do not deviate from the planned investigation submit-
ted to the FDA in the IND.39 The investigator is responsible for obtaining
the informed consent of each research subject, keeping accurate records of
data collected during the investigation, and ensuring that an institutional
review board' approves and continues to review the progress of the investi-
gation.4" Thus, the IND regulations ensure that researchers will treat
human subjects with respect, justice and beneficence.
C. The Drug Approval Process
To meet its statutory burden of proving to the FDA that an investiga-
tional drug is both safe and effective for its intended use, a drug sponsor
must submit the new drug to a myriad of tests during the investigational
process.42 Typically, the process begins with preclinical studies in which the
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1982).
36. Id. § 355(i)(1).
37. Id. § 355(i).
38. Id.
39. 21 C.F.R. § 312 (1988).
40. Each research hospital has an institutional review board (IRB) composed of medical,
ethical and lay professionals which is charged by the FDA with the responsibility of monitor-
ing the day-to-day progress of the clinical trial and of ensuring the rights of human test sub-
jects. Id. § 56. The IRB ensures that the patient is aware of the investigational nature of the
drug, understands the risks and benefits of taking the drug, and gives his or her informed
consent to treatment. Id. The IRB further ensures that ethical guidelines are followed in all
clinical trials including trials in which placebos are administered. See R. LEVINE, supra note
3, at 325-28.
The IND regulations require that the investigator ensure that the IRB fulfills its duties as set
forth in § 56 of the FDA drug regulations. 21 C.F.R. § 312.66 (1988). Section 56 charges
IRBs with the responsibility of ensuring that clinical investigations involving human research
subjects are conducted in accordance with medical ethics. Id. § 56. Since medical ethics dic-
tate that placebos cannot be used if a known drug is effective in treating a disease, it is the
responsibility of the IRB to monitor the clinical tests to determine whether testing shows any
drug to be effective in treating the disease. Id.
41. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.60, 312.61, 312.62, 312.64, 312.66, 312.68 (1988).
42. To obtain FDA approval to distribute and market a new drug, a sponsor must submit
"full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe
for use and whether such drug is effective in use." 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (1982). The FDA
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investigator conducts drug tests in vitro and administers the drug to labora-
tory animals.43 Once the results of the in vitro and animal studies show that
the drug is sufficiently safe, the sponsor submits an IND application to the
FDA for approval to begin clinical testing of the drug on human subjects."
The IND regulations separate clinical testing into three phases.4" In
Phase 1, the investigator administers the drug to a small group of healthy
subjects to gather preliminary information about the drug's relative safety
for humans."6 In Phase 2, the investigator administers the drug, in con-
trolled clinical trials, to a small group of patients suffering from the disease
for which the drug was developed.47
Whereas Phase 1 primarily focuses on whether the drug is safe for
humans, Phase 2 begins to focus on whether the drug is effective in the pa-
tient population for which the drug is intended.48 If the drug shows promise
in the Phase 2 trials, the investigator begins Phase 3 of the drug testing pro-
cess. Based on the data obtained in the earlier phases, the investigator ex-
may deny a sponsor's application if the FDA finds a "lack of substantial evidence that the drug
will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof." Id. § 355(d)(5). The amended
Act defines "substantial evidence" as:
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
the effectiveness of the drug involved on the basis of which it could fairly and respon-
sibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.
Id. § 355(d).
43. See Preamble to Proposed IND Rewrite, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,720, 26,726 (1983) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) (proposed June 9, 1983). For an overview of the drug development
process see id. at 26,723.
44. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1988).
45. Id. § 312.21; see also Hurley, Planning Research and Development of New Drugs to
Assure Regulatory Approval, 39 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 312, 313 (1984).
46. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (1988). Phase 1 testing is generally conducted on healthy vol-
unteers, although patients may be enrolled in the study. Id. Phase 1 focuses on the pharmaco-
logical action of the drug, the side effects of the drug and the ideal dosage and method of
administration in humans. Id. Phase 1 trials typically involve between 20 and 80 volunteers.
Id.; see also AIDS Drug Development and Related Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources of the House Comm. on Government Oper-
ations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-82 (1986) [hereinafter AIDS Hearing] (testimony of Walter R.
Dowdle, Ph.D., AIDS Coordinator, Public Health Service, HHS).
47. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (1988). Phase 2 trials typically involve several hundred sub-
jects. Id.
48. The regulations state that "Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical studies conducted
to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in patients
with the disease or condition under study and to determine the common short-term side effects
and risks associated with the drug." Id.
1988]
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pands the trials in Phase 3 to include a much larger group of patients.49 The
objective of Phase 3 trials is to assess the safety and effectiveness of the drug
in diagnosing and treating the intended patient population.5° Phase 2 and 3
trials often involve double blind tests in which certain patients receive place-
bos while others receive the active drug.
51
The IND regulations, promulgated by the FDA pursuant to the amended
Act, have protected human research subjects from abusive research and have
protected American consumers against a Thalidomide-type tragedy. Com-
mentators argue, however, that by increasing regulation of drug testing and
development, Congress and the FDA have traded an efficient drug market
for a safe one. While acknowledging that the investigational drug regula-
tions have effectively prevented drug manufacturers from introducing unsafe
and ineffective drugs in the market, these commentators argue that the regu-
lations have also prevented desperately ill patients from gaining access to
promising drugs.
II. CURRENTS OF CHANGE AT THE FDA
Approximately fifteen years after Congress enacted the Drug Amend-
ments, several independent forces began churning and then converged to
pressure the FDA to revise its drug regulations. First, statistics produced by
critics of the Drug Amendments, which revealed a substantial increase in
drug development time, fueled increasingly louder cries from terminally ill
patients for access to investigational drugs.52 Second, the Reagan adminis-
49. Phase 3 trials typically involve between several hundred to several thousand patients.
Id. § 312.21(c).
50. Id.
51. Because Phase 1 of a clinical drug test focuses on safety and not on effectiveness, each
subject in Phase 1 will receive the active drug. Investigators only use placebos in Phase 2 and
Phase 3 trials, where the investigators require a standard against which the effectiveness of a
new drug can be measured. AIDS Hearing, supra note 46, at 81-82 (testimony of Walter R.
Dowdle, Ph.D., AIDS Coordinator, Public Health Service, HHS). Investigators use placebos
in controlled clinical trials where there exists no known standard therapy for the disease. In
order to ethically justify using a placebo on a human test subject, there must exist a valid null
hypothesis which states that no treatment is any better than any other treatment. Hence, the
investigator must believe that the new drug being tested will provide no greater benefit to the
patient than the inert placebo. Id. at 56-57 (testimony of Robert J. Levine, M.D., Professor of
Medicine, Yale Univ. School of Medicine). Obviously, the investigator's goal is to disprove the
null hypothesis. Once the investigator has reason to believe that one treatment provides better
results than any other treatment, the investigator can no longer justify the placebo-controlled
trial. Id. For example, since certain treatments are relatively effective in treating cancer, it
would be unethical to test a new cancer treatment against a placebo control. Therefore, new
cancer treatments must be tested against existing cancer treatments. Id. at 69. For a thorough
discussion of the ethics of using placebos in clinical trials, see Rosner, The Ethics of Random-
ized Clinical Trials, 82 AM. J. MED. 283 (1987).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 55-63.
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tration's agenda to ease regulation in various sectors of the economy in-
cluded a plan to relax regulations of investigational drugs." Third, the
AIDS virus, a fatal disease which swiftly struck thousands of young Ameri-
cans, became the final impetus for streamlining the FDA's drug
regulations.
54
A. Slow Drug Development and the Drug Lag
Soon after the FDA published its first regulations governing investiga-
tional drugs, critics began voicing concern that the amended Act increased
the time in which the FDA approved a new drug for marketing and created
a drug lag in the United States as compared to other countries." Because of
the exacting safety and efficacy requirements set forth in the IND regula-
tions, only an approximate twenty percent of INDs are approved for market-
ing. 56 The elapsed time from identification of a new chemical entity to drug
approval by the FDA is estimated at eleven years, and the cost approaches
$65,000,000 per drug.57 Prior to the enactment of the Drug Amendments,
the time frame from identification to approval spanned approximately two
and a half years,5" and the monetary cost was three to four times less than
the current cost. 59
The lag time for drug approval in the United States has caused desperately
53. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
55. For an extensive discussion of the delayed availability of new drugs within the United
States, see Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 24. These critics argue: "[F]irst, the additional
testing requirements stemming from the 1962 Amendments and subsequent regulations delay
the availability of important new drugs. Second, the increased costs of regulatory compliance
reduce the incentive for research and innovation. Third, the 1962 Amendments fail to reduce
the percentage of ineffective drugs on the market." Id. at 586.
For a review of the research conducted on the drug lag in the United States vis-a-vis other
countries, see Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 Drug
Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91 (1982). One study, cited by Schifrin, compares
the United States drug market with that of Britain and concludes:
[D]rug availability is more constrained in the United States in three respects: there
are more drugs available in Britain that are not available in the United States than
vice versa; drugs that are available in both countries are more often introduced in
Britain before being introduced in the United States; and drugs that are available in
both countries are more likely to be approved for a wider range of indications in
Britain than in the United States.
Id. at 95.
56. In the preamble to the proposed IND Rewrite, the FDA acknowledged that "only 20
percent of new chemical entities studied under an IND ever reach the NDA stage." Proposed
IND Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,720; see also Hurley, supra note 45, at 312.
57. Hurley, supra note 45, at 312.
58. Roberts & Bodenheimer, supra note 24, at 586.
59. See Schifrin, supra note 55, at 103.
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ill patients to petition the FDA for early access to promising investigational
drugs.' The drug lag vis-a-vis foreign drug markets has sent some of these
patients to foreign countries in search of a cure or treatment.61
In response to pleas from desperate patients and physicians for pre-mar-
keting access to investigational drugs, the FDA developed ad hoc, uncodified
procedures for granting early access. The "compassionate use" exemption
allows drug companies, under strict agency supervision, to provide promis-
ing investigational drugs to terminally ill patients before the FDA approves
the drug for marketing.62 Because the FDA had never codified the exemp-
tion, however, and because patients and physicians experienced difficulty in
obtaining information regarding access to investigational drugs under the
compassionate use exemption, 63 advocates of drug regulation reform contin-
ued to pressure the FDA for easier access to promising new drugs.
B. The Reagan Administration's Regulatory Agenda
President Reagan entered office promising to ease government regulation
in various sectors of the economy.'M The President appointed Vice President
Bush to head the Task Force on Regulatory Relief. The task force's vehicle
for revising selected regulations was OMB.
OMB assumed a leading role in the struggle to reform the FDA's drug
regulations.65 As the enforcer of President Reagan's national deregulation
60. See Premable to Proposed IND Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,728.
61. See AIDS Hearing, supra note 46 at 5-8 (testimony of Paul Popham and John Smith,
two AIDS patients).
62. See id. at 58-60 (testimony of Robert J. Levine, Professor of Medicine, Yale Univ.
School of Medicine); id. at 101 (testimony of Dr. Harry Meyer, Director, Center for Drugs and
Biologics, FDA).
63. The "compassionate use" exemption was seen by many as an inadequate solution,
since patients and physicians experienced great difficulty obtaining information regarding ac-
cess to the drug. Id. at 5-11 (testimony of Paul Popham and John Smith, two AIDS patients).
Historically, drug companies have performed research on investigational new drugs in a rather
secretive manner. Preferring to shield investigatory research from public scrutiny so that news
of early success does not feed false hope to desperately ill patients, drug companies tradition-
ally maintain a low profile until a new drug is certain to be approved. Consequently, patients
and their physicians have extreme difficulty obtaining information regarding the discovery of
promising new drugs, the existence of clinical trials, and the qualifications necessary to be
accepted into clinical trials. Id. The FDA recognized the need for increased information to
the medical community regarding the availability of investigational drugs and cited this lack of
information as one of the reasons for its attempt to codify the "compassionate use" exemption
in the IND Rewrite. See Preamble to Proposed IND Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,728-29.
64. See OMB WATCH, supra note 14, at 11.
65. Shortly after the FDA published reproposed regulations for treatment use and sale of
investigational drugs, see Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product
Regulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 8850 (1987) (proposed Mar. 19, 1987)
[hereinafter Reproposal], Ted Weiss, chairman of the House subcommittee responsible for
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program, OMB targeted the drug development and approval process for reg-
ulatory reform." Certain OMB staffers believed that the federal govern-
ment should not interfere with a physician's right to prescribe experimental
drugs to desperately ill patients.6
Although the FDA had begun to revise its drug regulations before the
Reagan administration entered office,68 OMB expedited the publication of
proposed rules designed to streamline the drug development and approval
process. In October 1982, the FDA published a proposed "NDA Rewrite"
which addressed the drug approval process. 69  The proposed "IND Re-
write," published in June 1983,70 focused on the drug development process.
Included in the IND Rewrite was a provision which essentially codified the
ad hoc compassionate use procedures for allowing terminally ill patients ac-
cess to promising new drugs.71
C. The AIDS Epidemic
The proposed IND and NDA Rewrites represented a significant effort on
the part of the FDA to streamline the drug development and approval
FDA oversight, held a hearing on the regulations. Representative Weiss noted that one of the
objectives of the hearing was to "examine the decisionmaking process that led to the repro-
posal and, in particular, the pivotal role played by political appointees in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB)." FDA Proposal to Ease Restrictions on the Use and Sale of
Experimental Drugs: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmen-
tal Relations of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987)
[hereinafter Drug Hearing] (testimony of Rep. Ted Weiss).
66. See Experimental Drugs, Power and the Limits of Deregulation, Wash. Post, July 15,
1987, at A21, col. 1. At the congressional oversight hearing on the FDA's Reproposal regard-
ing early access to investigational drugs, see supra note 65, Representative Weiss produced a
document showing that certain staffers at OMB believed that the FDA should not have the
authority to deny a patient access to an investigational drug. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at
280-83. Representative Weiss expressed grave concern over "OMB's position that physicians
should be allowed to do whatever they think is best under the circumstances, irrespective of
what FDA concludes about the safety or efficacy of a new drug." Id. at 129.
67. See id.; see also infra note 134.
68. In the preamble to the final IND Rewrite, the FDA explains that it first published
"concept papers" on drug regulation reform in 1979. See New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic
Drug Product Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 8798 (1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) (proposed
June 9, 1983) [hereinafter Final IND Rewrite].
69. New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,622 (1982) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 314) (proposed Oct. 19, 1982) [hereinafter Proposed NDA Rewrite].
70. Proposed IND Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,720.
71. At a congressional oversight hearing to investigate the history of the investigational
drug regulations, see infra text accompanying note 165, FDA Commissioner Frank Young
testified that the 1983 proposed IND Rewrite "merely codified the agency's current unwritten
criteria for granting treatment IND requests." See Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 94 (testi-
mony of FDA Commissioner Frank Young).
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processes.72 In the early 1980's, however, the deadly AIDS virus emerged
on the national health scene, fueling a demand for new drugs to treat and
cure patients afflicted with the disease.73
In September 1981, the Centers for Disease Control reported 129 AIDS
cases in the United States.7 4 The number of cases began to increase dramati-
cally. The Centers for Disease Control reported 257 AIDS cases by Febru-
ary 1982; 1,029 cases by January 1983; 4,115 cases by April 1984; 8,229
cases by February 1985; and 16,458 cases by January 1986. 7' The Surgeon
General reports that health officials expect 179,000 AIDS-related deaths by
1989 and 270,000 reported cases by the end of 1991.76
The alarming rise in the number of AIDS victims increased the pressure
on the FDA to drastically ease access to investigational drugs.77 This pres-
sure, combined with pressure from other terminally ill patients, provided
OMB with the justification it needed to impose its drug regulation reform
agenda on the FDA.
While the FDA sought to ease restrictions on experimental drugs intended
for desperately ill patients, OMB sought to eliminate such restrictions. The
power play which ensued between the agency and the administration over
the investigational drug regulations resulted in large part from the emer-
gence of OMB as the regulator of agency rulemaking.
72. In the proposed IND Rewrite, the FDA indicated that the modifications were in-
tended to streamline the IND process while upholding high standards to protect human test
subjects. Proposed IND Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,720.
73. At a 1986 congressional hearing, two AIDS patients testified that AIDS victims are
desperate for drugs to treat the AIDS virus. See AIDS Hearing, supra note 46, at 5-13 (testi-
mony of Paul Popham and John Smith, two AIDS patients). The AIDS patients also testified
that AIDS victims and their physicians often are unable to obtain information concerning new
AIDS drugs because drug manufacturers typically do not disclose such information until the
drug is nearing the approval stage. Id. One patient testified that AIDS patients are "so des-
perate to find something" that they are spending large sums of money and traveling to foreign
countries in search of a treatment or cure. Id. at 7.
74. See 35 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 17-21 (Jan. 17, 1986).
75.' Id.
76. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT
ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 6 (1986).
77. At the congressional oversight hearing to explore the history of the investigational
drug regulations, FDA Commissioner Frank Young presented written testimony confirming
that AIDS patients played a major role in the FDA's attempt to ease restrictions on investiga-
tional drugs. Commissioner Young wrote that "[a]lthough the issue of early availability of
breakthrough drugs clearly applies to a wide number of serious and life-threatening disease
categories, the current AIDS epidemic has focused attention on the early availability of experi-
mental drugs as never before, and rightly so." Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 77.
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III. EMERGENCE OF OMB AS THE REGULATOR OF REGULATORS
A. The Rise of OMB
OMB's role in agency rulemaking has grown steadily over the past several
decades.78 In 1971, President Nixon instituted a review process requiring
administrative agencies to circulate proposed rules to OMB and other agen-
cies for comment before final publication.79 Later, President Ford instructed
agencies to prepare and submit to OMB an economic impact statement for
every major rule.8° In 1978, President Carter implemented a regulatory re-
form program, designating OMB as official overseer.8" Carter required
agencies to prepare a regulatory analysis for each significant regulation and
to submit the analysis to a central committee which would identify and elim-
inate duplicative regulatory efforts.82
During the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, OMB enjoyed an
active role in agency rulemaking. OMB had very little power, however, to
actually sway an agency rule.8 3 Thus, while OMB's visibility in agency
rulemaking increased during earlier administrations, not until the Reagan
78. In large part, the growth of OMB's role in rulemaking procedures is in direct response
to the growth of administrative agencies in the 1960s and 1970s. See Morrison, OMB Interfer-
ence with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1059, 1060-63 (1986). One commentator observed that the "shift in the center of gravity of
lawmaking" from Congress to the agencies is in large part "due to the increasing complexity of
modem society." Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of
Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 209 (1981).
Observers of OMB's expanded role point to a number of reasons for this expansion, includ-
ing the fact that agencies, pursuant to congressional instruction but with little coordination
between themselves, began drafting extensive and costly regulations without considering the
economic effects of the regulations on industries struggling in a depressed economy. Morrison,
supra, at 1060-62.
79. See OMB WATCH, supra note 14, at 10; Morrison, supra note 78, at 1060-63; Rosen-
berg, supra note 78, at 222-25.
80. OMB WATCH, supra note 14, at 10. President Ford sought to sensitize regulators to
the consequential costs of regulations. Id.; see also Morrison, supra note 78, at 1061.
81. OMB WATCH, supra note 14, at 10-11; see also OMB WATCH, OMB CONTROL OF
RULEMAKING: THE END OF PUBLIC ACCESS, 4 (1985) [hereinafter CONTROL OF RULEMAK-
ING]; Morrison, supra note 78, at 1061.
82. OMB WATCH, supra note 14, at 11; CONTROL OF RULEMAKING, supra note 81, at 5;
Morrison, supra note 78, at 1060-63.
83. One observer commented that "It]he Carter program, like its predecessors, has been
judged a failure by some because it lacked a formal enforcement mechanism." CONTROL OF
RULEMAKING, supra note 81, at 5. Another observer remarked that prior to the Reagan ad-
ministration, each change in the rulemaking process "was a step toward greater centralization
and particularly toward insuring a greater decisional role of persons outside the agency includ-
ing various economic advisers in the White House. Yet with very few exceptions . . . the
ultimate policy decisions remained both legally and practically in the hands of the individual
agencies." Morrison, supra note 78, at 1062.
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administration's arrival did OMB experience a marked growth in its power
to influence specific agency rules.
B. OMB Under the Reagan Administration
OMB secured a prominent position in the agency rulemaking process
under the Reagan administration. In 1980, Congress passed the Paperwork
Reduction Act 4 to cut federal information-collecting activities."5 The stat-
ute authorizes OMB to review proposed agency rules to determine whether
an agency information collection request is "necessary for the proper per-
formance of the functions of the agency" 86 and to ensure that the "informa-
tion will have practical utility for the agency.",
87
In 1981, President Reagan broadened OMB's authority by issuing Execu-
tive Order 12,291 (First Reagan Order).88 Pursuant to the First Reagan
Order, an agency seeking to promulgate a rule must submit the rule to OMB
before publication, and must justify the economic cost of the new regula-
tion. 89 Upon review of the rule, OMB may make comments on the rule to
which the agency must respond, "to the extent permitted by law,"'  before
issuing the rule.91
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,498 (Second Reagan Order)
in 1985, which further expanded OMB's rulemaking authority. 92 The Sec-
ond Reagan Order requires agency heads to ensure that agency regulations
conform with the regulatory goals of the President,9" and to submit regula-
84. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3520 (1982)).
85. The stated goal of the Paperwork Reduction Act is to minimize record keeping and
reporting requirements. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
86. Id. § 3504(c)(2).
87. Id.
88. First Reagan Order, supra note 17.
89. The First Reagan Order provides that major rules must be sent to the OMB accompa-
nied by a Regulatory Impact Analysis which sets forth the costs and benefits of the proposed
rule and explains the reasons for not selecting alternative regulatory approaches. Id. at 13,194,
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(3)(d) (1982). Major rules are defined as rules which will have an
annual economic impact of $ 100 million or more, a major economic impact on a certain sector
of the economy or an adverse impact on an industry's ability to compete abroad. Id. at 13,193,
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(l)(b).
90. Id. at 13,196, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(2).
91. OMB may delay comment on the rule indefinitely, thereby exercising a "pocket veto."
Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review ofAgency Violations of Execu-
tive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 294-95 (1983). If OMB transmits comments to the
agency, the agency may decide to withdraw the rule if the agency cannot adequately modify
the rule to satisfy OMB comments. Rosenfield, Presidential Policy Management of Agency
Rules Under Reagan Order 12,498, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 63, 76 & n.80 (1986).
92. Second Reagan Order, supra note 17.
93. Id. at 1036, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(3)(a).
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tory objectives to OMB for annual review prior to taking any regulatory
actions, including fact-finding investigations.94
C. Criticisms of OMB's Influence On Agency Rulemaking
The Paperwork Reduction Act and the two Reagan Executive Orders pur-
portedly were designed to alleviate recordkeeping and reporting burdens on
the public," to ensure that agency rules are cost-sensitive, 96 and to effec-
tively allocate resources in light of the administration's agenda.97 Commen-
tators have noted, however, that the statute and the two orders have given
OMB a "regulatory 'pocket veto' "98 and that the Reagan administration has
effectively substituted OMB's discretion for agency discretion.99 By giving
OMB authority to review agency rules and by obligating agencies to respond
to OMB's comments, the First Reagan Order enables OMB to coerce agen-
cies into fashioning rules which reflect the President's deregulatory
agenda."° ° Because OMB conducts its review and comment process in se-
crecy,' O1 the regulatory history of a rule is often unknown to Congress and
to the public."12 Critics of the Second Reagan Order argue that it not only
entitles OMB to bar individual agency rules, but that it also empowers OMB
to meddle in every aspect of an agency's rulemaking activity."0 3
1. Constitutional Concerns
Observers of OMB's emergence as regulator of the regulators have raised
constitutional concerns regarding the President's authority to empower
94. Id. at 1036-37, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(2)(a).
95. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
98. Raven-Hansen, supra note 91, at 295.
99. See Morrison, supra note 78, at 1063; Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 214-16.
100. For interesting illustrations and analyses of OMB's coercive tactics, see Rosenfield,
supra note 91, at 97-101. Rosenfield documents how OMB, in 1983, forced the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to radically modify a regulation proposed under the Clean Water
Act. Id. at 97-98.
101. See infra note 117.
102. For example, the role which OMB played in the FDA's new drug regulations was not
clear. See infra text accompanying notes 217-19. Congress held a subcommittee hearing to
uncover the extent of OMB's involvement in the FDA's rulemaking process. See infra notes
165-83 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 120-23.
One commentator observed that the Reagan regulatory reform process "alters the assump-
tions Congress and the public can make about agency decisions since it is no longer clear to
what extent regulatory decisions reflect OMB or agency policy." OMB WATCH, supra note
14, at 11.
103. The Second Reagan Order seeks to force agencies to apply the President's regulatory
policies not only to individual regulations, but also to the broad goals and objectives of the
agency. See Rosenfield, supra note 91, at 71-72.
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OMB to regulate agency rulemaking. "4 Article II of the United States Con-
stitution, which vests executive power in the President, does not address the
President's role in administrative decisionmaking. Article II empowers the
President to appoint'0 5 and commission" 6 officers of the United States and
to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
Executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their re-
spective Offices." 10 7 Article II further instructs the President to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."' '
Because the Constitution does not expressly authorize the President to
oversee agency rulemaking, the central question is whether article II implic-
itly gives the President such power. Most legal commentators argue that
because the framers divided federal power between three separate branches
and expressly vested legislative power in Congress, the framers did not in-
tend for the President to supervise the substance of agency rules."° The
President is subject to the laws enacted by Congress, which have delegated
rulemaking authority to respective agency heads by enacting various agency
enabling statutes.' 10 Thus, any inherent power which the President may
have over agency rulemaking activity is necessarily limited by the power
delegated to the agency heads.
The consensus is that while the President may have inherent constitu-
tional authority to issue executive orders designed to facilitate and coordi-
nate the operation of the executive branch, the agency head's congressionally
delegated discretionary authority limits the President's power to influence
agency rulemaking."'1 Moreover, beyond the constitutional question, Con-
gress and legal commentators are growing increasingly concerned over the
practices OMB has adopted to implement the Reagan Orders.112
104. See, e.g., Oversight of the Office of Management and Budget Regulatory Review and
Planning Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986) [hereinafter OMB Hearing]
(Sen. Gore states: "I have felt since the inception of Executive Order 12,291 that it was simply
unconstitutional and that it was only a matter of time before that conclusion was reached in
the courts.").
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
106. Id. at cl. 3.
107. Id. at cl. 1.
108. Id. at § 3.
109. Morton Rosenberg, a specialist in American public law with the Congressional Re-
search Service, argues that "[t]he idea that power over administrative decision-making derives
from the President's role as head of the executive branch or inheres in the concept of 'executive
power', . . . is inconsistent with a written Constitution establishing divided, limited govern-
ment." Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 197; see also Rosenfield, supra note 91, at 78-79.
110. Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 202-06.
111. Id. at 209-12.




The emergence of OMB as the regulator of agency rulemaking raises im-
portant policy questions. The central policy questions concern whether and
to what extent the President should oversee agency rulemaking, regardless of
whether the Constitution authorizes executive oversight. While some com-
mentators argue that executive supervision of agency rulemaking brings con-
sistency, 1 1 3 coordination,"14 and accountability'" 5 to federal regulatory
policy, the recent track record reveals that OMB, operating in a secretive
Senator Carl Levin stated that although he is an advocate of executive coordination of agency
rulemaking, "the OMB is undermining the genuine support for the concept of Executive over-
sight ... by the high-handed and strong-arm manner in which it is implementing the concept."
Id. at 57; see also infra text accompanying notes 117-23.
113. Some commentators argue that the President should coordinate conflicting rulemak-
ing activity caused by broad enabling statutes that grant several agencies regulatory authority
over the same industry. Proponents argue that the President, as chief executive, should bal-
ance and coordinate national regulatory policy. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (1986). For instance, in the late
1970s, the nuclear technology industry was regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
the EPA, and the Department of Energy. The regulation of hazardous chemicals was con-
trolled by the EPA, the FDA, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Trans-
portation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. Today, recombinant DNA research is regulated by the EPA,
OSHA, FDA, NIH and the Department of Agriculture. Id.
114. Proponents of executive management of agency rulemaking have argued that OMB
can facilitate the flow of information between agencies and thereby reduce the amount of time
required to promulgate a new rule. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 113, at 1080-82;
Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 181, 188-94 (1986). OMB's involvement in the rulemaking process, however, tends
instead to drag out the rulemaking process and cause lengthy delays. Under the First Reagan
Order, OMB has 60 days to respond to a proposed rule and 30 days to respond to a final rule.
First Reagan Order, supra note 88, at 13,195, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(3)(e)(2) (1982). If
the OMB Director disagrees or disapproves of any portion of the proposal or rule, the Director
may stop progress on the proposal or rule until it has been revised. Id. at 13,195, reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601(3)(f)(1). It is this latter provision which has caused delay in agency rulemaking.
At a recent OMB oversight hearing, two witnesses testified that OMB successfully delays
rules which are not popular with OMB staff. In one instance, OMB delayed OSHA's efforts to
promulgate regulations of grain elevators for over three years. See OMB Hearing, supra note
104, at 47-51 (testimony of Deborah Berkowitz, Director, Safety and Health, Food and Allied
Service Trades Dept., AFL-CIO). In another instance, OMB ignored a congressional deadline
by which EPA was to promulgate regulations for hazardous waste in underground storage
tanks. Although the agency was required to publish regulations by March 1, 1985, OMB
delayed promulgation of a final rule until June 26, 1985. Id. at 76-77 (testimony of Robert V.
Percival, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund).
115. Proponents of executive oversight of agency rulemaking argue that rulemakers should
be accountable to the President, who is accountable to a national constituency. "[T]he Presi-
dent is electorally accountable. Equally important, he is the only official in government with a
national constituency. These characteristics make him uniquely well-situated to design regula-
tory policy in a way that is responsive to the interests of the public as a whole." Strauss &
Sunstein, supra note 114, at 190; see also DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 113, at 1080-82.
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manner, attempts to dictate policy positions to agencies without justifying its
position to either the agency, the public, or Congress." 6
In fact, OMB's review practices have led to increasing concern that OMB,
rather than injecting a higher level of consistency, coordination, and ac-
countability into the rulemaking process, has transformed the rulemaking
process into a secretive, coercive, and off-the-record power struggle between
OMB and the agencies." 7 In recent congressional oversight hearings, con-
gressmen characterized OMB as a "swamp""'  and a "black hole,""' 9 be-
cause once an agency transmits a proposed rule to OMB for review, the
agency loses track of the proposal's whereabouts.
While most agencies adhere to the notice, comment, and recordkeeping
procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act,'2 ' OMB shuns
public and congressional inquiry and avoids making a record on which it
could be held accountable. OMB comments are virtually never transmitted
116. One critic wrote:
[U]nder the present system, OMB can simply refuse to approve a regulation without
giving any reason, and an agency head is left the job of devising an acceptable expla-
nation for refusing to proceed or for deleting a particularly offensive requirement.
And, because this process operates in secret, there is no way for the public, the Con-
gress, or the courts to know precisely what OMB has done and what the real basis is
for decisions issued under the nominal signature of the agency head.
Morrison, supra note 78, at 1067-68; see also Rosenfield, supra note 91, at 97-101.
117. Many observers have expressed alarm at OMB's refusal to conduct its review process
in an open manner. One commentator observes that "[s]ecrecy pervades virtually all OMB
review." Rosenfield, supra note 91, at 97. At a recent OMB oversight hearing, one senator
expressed frustration with OMB's refusal to open its records to public scrutiny. Emphasizing
the importance of the EPA's grain dust regulations, Senator Levin stated:
The identity of the persons who have been making these decisions has been hidden
from the public. OMB's role in this whole rulemaking process has been hidden. We
have made efforts over the years to try to bring this to public light so that people will
be accountable for those decisions, but we have so far not succeeded, and OMB has
not complied with what is [sic] obviously strong signals coming from the public and
from the Congress.
OMB Hearing, supra note 104, at 2-3 (testimony of Sen. Carl Levin).
118. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 98 (testimony of Rep. Ted Weiss).
119. OMB Hearing, supra note 104, at 99 (testimony of Sen. Durenberger). Senator
Durenberger supports the role of OMB as the "voice of efficiency and coordination" in agency
rulemaking. Id. Like other watchful observers of OMB's increasing involvement in agency
rulemaking, however, Senator Durenberger expresses growing concern over the methods OMB
chooses to implement its supervisory powers.
OMB continues to keep its oversight role both secret and one-sided. Under the cur-
rent process, OMB can delay proposed rules for any length of time, it can interfere
with statutory deadlines for regulations, it can serve as a secret conduit for industry
opposition to rules and it can impose its own limited interpretation of cost-benefit
analysis to the exclusion of other relevant considerations. And, in fact, OMB has
done all of these things.
Id.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
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in writing to the agency, but instead are conveyed over the telephone."'
Because of the secretive nature of OMB's review, agency heads are often
unaware of the status of a rule or proposal once it has been transmitted to
OMB. "'22 Although it may appear from the public record that an agency has
drafted and promulgated a new rule, in fact OMB may have played a major
role in fashioning the rule without ever accounting for its role. 2 3 Rather
than make the executive agencies more accountable to the public, OMB has
merely ensured that the agencies are more accountable to OMB.
IV. OMB's ROLE IN THE FDA's INVESTIGATIONAL DRUG
REGULATIONS: THE LANGUAGE, THE STRUGGLE
AND THE RESOLUTION
The history of the FDA's new investigational drug regulations clearly
demonstrates the secretive manner in which OMB has chosen to influence
agency regulations. After the FDA submitted its proposal to OMB, OMB
reviewed the substantive provisions of the proposal and proceeded to badger
the FDA into adopting key provisions drafted by OMB staff. A subsequent
congressional hearing exposed OMB's role in drafting the regulations and
the FDA, thereafter, revised its regulations before final publication.
In 1985, the FDA submitted revised IND regulations governing the drug
development process to OMB for approval before publication. 24 The IND
121. See Rosenfield, supra note 91, at 96-97. One example of the extent of the secrecy was
uncovered at a recent OMB oversight hearing. OMB, refusing to transmit written comments
to OSHA, dictated its comments over the phone, which an OSHA staffer then transcribed.
Because certain agency staffers were concerned over the implications of OMB's comments,
"[tihis paper was leaked out of OSHA. There was an exchange in a men's room between a
staff [member] of the House and some OSHA staff people to leak this out. It was typed up and
released to the Washington Post." OMB Hearing, supra note 104, at 10 (testimony of Deborah
Berkowitz, Director of Safety and Health, Food and Allied Services Trade Dept., AFL-CIO).
This type of behavior is a far cry from the accountability and openness which proponents of
executive oversight might envision.
122. In fact, the director of OMB and members of Congress may be unaware of which
OMB staff members rejected or approved an agency rule. At a recent Senate oversight hear-
ing, OMB Director James C. Miller could not identify the OMB staffer responsible for re-
jecting an agency's technical analysis which justified the agency's proposed rule. OMB
Hearing, supra note 104, at 179; see also infra note 175 and accompanying text.
123. One Senator recently opined:
[We should make sure that the decisionmakers are held accountable for their deci-
sions ... [b]ecause OMB is working in the dark, and not in the daylight, because
there is no requirement in the law that OMB's input be made public so that we know
who is making these decisions. Right now the decisionmaker is not held accountable
for his decisions.
OMB Hearing, supra note 104, at 11 (testimony of Sen. Levin).
124. The preamble to the proposed IND Rewrite indicates that the FDA submitted the
proposal to OMB in 1983. See Preamble to Proposed IND Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,735.
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Rewrite proposal contained provisions to streamline the IND process 25 and
to codify the compassionate use exemption which the FDA had developed to
allow terminally ill patients access to investigational drugs.'2 6 The FDA
defined the section that codified the compassionate use exemption as "treat-
ment use of an investigational new drug."'
127
Seven months later,' 2 s OMB transmitted its unwritten comments to the
FDA, suggesting revisions to two sections of the proposed IND Rewrite.
First, OMB sought revised language in the treatment use section of the pro-
posal, effectively limiting the FDA's capacity to deny requests for investiga-
tional drugs.'2 9 Second, OMB wanted to delete the section prohibiting sale
of investigational drugs and to substitute it with a section allowing such
sale. 30 Because the FDA was reluctant to accept OMB's changes, a power
play ensued. Over a year later, the FDA simultaneously published the final
IND Rewrite,' without OMB's changes, 132 and a reproposal incorporating
OMB's desired language in the two controversial sections.1
33
A. The Language: OMB's Proposed Changes to the Rule
The Reproposal, containing OMB's desired changes to the treatment use
and sale sections of the IND Rewrite, represented a drastic change in the
FDA's investigational drug regulations. The changes sought by OMB to the
treatment use section of the regulations conflicted with the statutory lan-
However, at the congressional oversight hearing to examine the history of the investigational
drug regulations, see infra text accompanying notes 165-66, FDA Commissioner Frank Young
testified that the FDA submitted the IND Rewrite proposal to OMB on July 25, 1985. See
Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 95.
125. In the preamble to the proposed IND Rewrite, the FDA stated that the regulations
reflect the FDA's commitment to "facilitate the development, evaluation, and approval of safe
and effective new therapies without compromising the underlying standards of safety and effec-
tiveness upon which the American public has come to depend." Preamble to Proposed IND
Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,720.
126. In the preamble to the proposed IND Rewrite, the FDA acknowledged its historical
policy of allowing seriously ill patients access to investigational drugs through a compassionate
use exemption. Id. at 26,728-29. The FDA explained that the proposed IND Rewrite merely
codified the compassionate use exemption. Id. The FDA specifically stated that the IND
Rewrite would retain the agency's current policy prohibiting the unapproved sale of investiga-
tional drugs. Id. at 26,734.
127. Id. at 26,742.
128. The proposed IND Rewrite was submitted to OMB on July 25, 1985. Drug Hearing,
supra note 65, at 95. OMB responded to the FDA in February 1986. Id.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 141-45.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 152-60.
131. Final IND Rewrite, supra note 68, at 8798.
132. The final IND Rewrite retained a modified prohibition against sale, id. at 8833, and
reserved the section regarding treatment use. Id. at 8838.
133. Reproposal, supra note 65, at 8850.
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guage of the amended Act. In addition, OMB's proposed changes to the sale
provision of the IND regulations ran contrary to historical FDA principles.
First, OMB sought to allow patients with immediately life-threatening dis-
eases easy access to investigational drugs. Certain staff members at OMB
held the opinion that "it is not a Federal responsibility to second-guess a
licensed medical practitioner [sic] judgment that his patient will benefit from
the use of a particular drug." 134 Accordingly, OMB's changes would have
allowed patients with an immediately life-threatening disease to obtain inves-
tigational drugs without requiring the drug sponsor to prove the safety and
effectiveness of the drug. 13 5
As originally proposed by the FDA, the regulations would allow patients
with a "serious" disease 13 to obtain access to an investigational drug137 af-
ter the drug had completed Phase 2 trials13 8 and after the sponsor had gath-
ered "sufficient evidence of the drug's safety and effectiveness" to warrant its
use. 139 The FDA could deny a request for treatment use if it found that the
risk to the patient outweighed the potential benefit or if the FDA found
insufficient evidence to prove the safety and effectiveness of the drug."
134.. See Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 282 (memo authored by OMB staff member Bruce
Artim discussing the differences between OMB and FDA positions on the treatment use and
sale of investigational drugs). The internal OMB strategy memo states: "FDA refuses to
budge [from its position on treatment use which] places total discretion [in] the agency. Essen-
tially, our position takes the viev that it is not a Federal responsibility to second-guess a li-
censed medical practitioner [sic] judgment that his patient will benefit from the use of a
particular drug." Id.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 141-45. The Reproposal did contain certain re-
strictions on the type of drugs available for access. The Reproposal required that the drug
must be "intended to treat [an] ... immediately life-threatening disease" for which "no satis-
factory alternative drug or other therapy" is available, and that the drug sponsor is investigat-
ing the drug in controlled clinical trials while "pursuing marketing approval of the drug with
due diligence." Reproposal, supra note 65, at 8856.
136. The IND Rewrite proposal identified only one patient group - those with a "serious
disease condition... for whom no satisfactory alternative drug or other therapy is available."
Proposed IND Rewrite, supra note 43 at 26,742. The Reproposal created two patient groups.
See infra note 141.
137. Section 312.34 of the IND Rewrite proposal provided that pre-marketing FDA ap-
proval for treatment use of an investigational new drug could be obtained in two ways. First, a
patient could request the drug sponsor to submit a treatment protocol to the FDA, or if the
sponsor did not want to submit a treatment protocol, the patient's physician could submit a
treatment IND to the FDA. Proposed IND Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,742.
138. Section 312.34(a) of the proposed IND Rewrite leaves open the possibility that access
may be granted during Phase 2 or earlier, but only "if compelling circumstances warrant [such
use]." Id.
139. Id.
140. Section 312.34(d) of the IND Rewrite proposal provided that the FDA could deny a
treatment protocol or treatment IND if it found that "[t]he potential risks outweigh the poten-
tial benefits of the drug in the treatment of patients," or if "[tihere is not sufficient evidence of
the drug's safety and effectiveness to justify its intended treatment use." Id. at 26,743.
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As reproposed pursuant to OMB's changes, the regulations would allow
patients with an "immediately life-threatening disease"141 access to an inves-
tigational drug prior to the completion of Phase 2 trials.142 Under the
Reproposal, the FDA would have no authority to deny a request for treat-
ment use of an investigational drug unless the FDA could produce evidence
to show that "the drug clearly does not provide a therapeutic benefit" or that
the drug would expose the patient to "an unreasonable and significant addi-
tional risk of illness or injury."' 143 Thus, the Reproposal shifted the burden
of proof, requiring the FDA to disprove the safety and effectiveness of a new
drug. Many experts, considering this burden insurmountable,'" argued that
the Reproposal would effectively deregulate investigational drugs intended
for patients with immediately life-threatening diseases.145
As reproposed, the rule contradicted the amended Act, which instructed
the FDA to regulate the distribution of investigational drugs. The amended
Act directs the FDA to exempt investigational drugs from the prohibition
against pre-approval distribution.146 The statute authorizes the FDA, in its
discretion, to base such exemptions on "conditions relating to the protection
of the public health," including the sponsor's submission to the FDA of re-
141. Reproposed § 312.34(b) separated the patient population into two groups: patients
with a "serious disease" and patients with an "immediately life-threatening disease." Repro-
posal, supra note 65, at 8856. The Reproposal did not define "serious disease" or "immedi-
ately life-threatening disease." The final rule on treatment use defines "immediately life-
threatening disease." See infra note 195.
142. Section 312.34(a) of the Reproposal states that investigational drugs intended for pa-
tients with a serious disease would ordinarily be made available after Phase 2 trials. Repro-
posal, supra note 65, at 8856. Investigational drugs intended for patients with an immediately
life-threatening disease, however, would be made available "earlier in the investigational pro-
cess" as FDA may permit. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 7-11 (letter to FDA regarding the Reproposal
signed by five former commissioners of FDA and four former chief counsels of FDA).
145. See infra note 160. Upon publication of the Reproposal, the FDA received hundreds
of letters from prominent physicians, researchers, and ethicists, urging the FDA to reconsider
its authority under the Reproposal to protect deathly ill patients from harmful drugs. See
Letter from John E. Jones, Vice President for Health Affairs, Medical Center, West Virginia
University 1 (Apr. 30, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 10, comment C00196) (burden
of proving safety and efficacy should remain with drug sponsor); Letter from Susan E. Krown,
M.D., Head of the AIDS Clinical Group, Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (Apr. 15, 1987)
(FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 8, comment C00103) (any attempt by FDA to prove that a
drug is ineffective would be virtually impossible); Memorandum from the Pharmacology Sub-
com. of the AIDS Treatment Evaluation Unit, Dep't of Health and Human Services 2 (Apr.
16, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 8, comment C00087) (FDA would have no basis
for denying access to ineffective drugs such as "sugar pills"); Comments of the Pharmaceutical
Mfrs. Ass'n 8 (May 4, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, comment C00229) (the
FDA's burden of proving that a drug is not safe is "virtually impossible").
146. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
[Vol. 38:175
Regulating the Regulators
ports of preclinical tests, the results of which are "adequate to justify the
proposed clinical testing."' 147
Interpreting the statute in United States v. Rutherford,1 48 the United
States Supreme Court held that drugs intended for terminally ill patients
were not exempt from the requirement of the FDA's pre-marketing ap-
proval. 149 The Court found specific congressional intent to protect all per-
sons, including those who are terminally ill, from unsafe or ineffective
drugs. 50 Thus, although OMB staff viewed the regulation of investigational
drugs as an interference with the physician's right to practice medicine,1 51
Congress viewed such regulation as a necessary safeguard to protect the
rights and welfare of human beings involved in the testing of experimental
drugs.
The second major change that OMB sought to the IND regulations con-
cerned the sale of investigational drugs. As originally proposed by the FDA,
the rule provided that drug sponsors could not promote,1 52 commercially
distribute,153 or sell 54 investigational drugs without prior agency approval.
Nor could sponsors prolong clinical testing of a new drug once the drug
showed promise.1 55 Under the Reproposal, the sponsor could sell an inves-
tigational drug to patients who received the drug under a "treatment proto-
col" 15 6 or "treatment IND"' 5 7 without prior, written agency consent as long
as the sale did not constitute commercial marketing, promotion, or advertis-
ing and as long as the sponsor actively pursued marketing approval.1 58
This revision represented a major change in traditional FDA practices and
procedures.1 59  By coupling the reproposed provision on treatment use,
147. 21.U.S.C. § 355(i) (1982).
148. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
149. Id. at 560.
150. Id. at 552-54.
151. See supra note 134.




156. See supra note 137.
157. Id.
158. Reproposal, supra note 65, at 8850. The Reproposal provided that a drug sponsor
could not sell an investigational new drug to patients involved in clinical trials without the
prior written consent of the FDA. Such consent would be based on the sponsor's explanation
of the need to sell the drug to human test subjects in order to continue the clinical trial. Id.
159. Beginning with its first investigational drug use regulations, the FDA assumed that
the cost of developing new drugs would be incurred by the pharmaceutical company and not
by the human test subject. See supra note 7. The OMB staff was aware of the fact that the
FDA historically denied requests to sell investigational drugs. See Drug Hearing, supra note
65, at 281 (memo prepared by OMB staff member Bruce Artim to compare the FDA's position
1988]
Catholic University Law Review
which severely limited the FDA's authority to deny access to investigational
drugs, with the reproposed provision allowing sale of investigational drugs,
the Reproposal represented a substantial deviation from traditional agency
practice. Thus, some FDA experts suggested that the combination of these
reproposed sections might prevent the FDA from regulating "quack"
drugs. '6
B. The Struggle: The Politics Behind the Changes
Upon reproposing the regulations governing treatment use and sale of in-
vestigational new drugs, the FDA sparked congressional and public interest.
Over 300 public comments poured into the FDA. 16' Although the public
generally supported the concept of granting early access to investigational
drugs,' 62 the comments focused on two concerns. First, the public ques-
on the treatment use and sale of investigational drugs with OMB's position). After the FDA
published the Reproposal, hundreds of comments poured into the FDA questioning the ethics
of allowing pharmaceutical companies to charge for investigational drugs. See infra note 164.
160. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 10-11. A letter commenting on the Reproposal, au-
thored by five former commissioners and four former chief counsels of the FDA, infra note
171, urged the FDA to add language to the Reproposal stating that the FDA could deny
access to investigational drugs unless the FDA had some evidence on which it could rationally
decide that the drug was safe and effective.
[W]e want to call attention to the interplay of [re]proposed § 312.34 and
[re]proposed § 312.7(d). We have no general objection to the sale of drugs adminis-
tered under an IND. If there were no requirement for some rational basis for believ-
ing an investigational drug may be effective, however, the permission to sell it
pursuant to § 312.7(d) could provide an unintended opportunity for the marketing of
governmentally legitimized quack drugs to those suffering from immediately life-
threatening diseases for which no satisfactory treatment is available.
Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 10-11.
161. Preamble to Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Reg-
ulations; Treatment Use and Sale; Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466 (1987) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 312) (proposed March 19, 1987) [hereinafter Final Rule].
162. The FDA received comments from individual patients, ethical organizations, research
hospitals, medical associations and pharmaceutical companies. The comments generally sup-
ported the concept of allowing desperately ill patients access to promising new drugs. See, e.g.,
Letter from R.E. Henkin, M.D., Chairman, Institutional Review Bd. for the Protection of
Human Subjects, Loyola Univ. of Chicago (Apr. 3, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 6,
comment C00065); Letter from American Psychological Ass'n (May 5, 1987) (FDA Docket
No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, comment C00245); Letter from American Medical Ass'n (May 5,
1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, comment C00236); Letter from American
Pharm. Ass'n (May 5, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, comment C00237); Dep't
of Health and Human Services, Memorandum of Meeting between FDA and Health Profes-
sional Groups (Mar. 27, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 6, memorandum MM
00002); Letter from Johns Hopkins University (May 5, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394,
vol. 11, comment C00260). Private patients suffering from terminal illnesses, however, did not
share the medical community's concerns regarding the FDA's diminished authority to regu-
late investigational drugs or the sale of investigational drugs. To these patients, the reproposed
regulations represented new hope for a treatment or cure for their illnesses, and they pleaded
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tioned whether the FDA retained sufficient authority to deny requests for
investigational drugs which had not been shown to be sufficiently safe or
effective. 163 Second, many comments addressed whether allowing the sale of
investigational drugs would create problems of equal access or would allow
pharmaceutical companies to profit from drugs which had not been shown
to be sufficiently safe or effective."M
The publication of the Reproposal also sparked congressional interest.
Representative Ted Weiss promptly scheduled an oversight hearing by a
with the FDA to ease access to investigational drugs. See, e.g., Comment C00101 (June 10,
1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 8) (husband of woman with Alzheimer's disease urges
FDA to test new drugs); Comment C00323 (May 21, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol.
12) (AIDS patient supports increased access to investigational drugs); Comment C00298 (May
5, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 12) (son of man stricken with cancer urges in-
creased access to investigational drugs); Comment C00069 (Apr. 14, 1987) (FDA Docket No.
82N-0394, vol. 6) (AIDS Related Complex patient supports availability of experimental treat-
ments); Comment 00278 (May 6, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11) (patient with
metastic disease supports access to investigational drugs).
163. See, e.g., Dep't of Health and Human Services, Memorandum from Pharmacology
Subcom. of the AIDS Treatment Evaluation Unit at 2 (Apr. 16, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-
0394, vol. 8, comment C00087) (under the reproposed regulations, the FDA would not have
the authority to deny access to ineffective drugs if there is no alternative drug or therapy
available); Letter from Susan E. Krown, M.D., Head of the AIDS Clinical Group, Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center 2 (Apr. 15, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 8, comment
C00103) (FDA's burden under the Reproposal of proving lack of effectiveness of new drug is
"virtually impossible" for drugs that have recently entered the testing process); Comments of
NIH staff 3-4 (May 5, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, comment C00247) (under
the Reproposal, the FDA would rarely have grounds to deny access to investigational drugs);
Dep't of Health and Human Service Memorandum of Meeting between FDA and Consumer
Groups and Orphan Drug Groups (Mar. 27, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 6, mem-
orandum MM 00002) (Reproposal weakens the safety and efficacy provisions of the drug ap-
proval process by shifting the burden of proof from the sponsor to the FDA).
164. See, e.g., Letter from Donald Abrams, M.D., Assistant Director, AIDS Clinic, San
Francisco General Hospital 2 (Apr. 29, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 10, comment
C00188) (decision to allow drug companies to sell unproven drugs is ethically questionable);
Comments of the American Medical Ass'n 5 (Apr. 30, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394,
vol. 11, comment C00236) (raises question of possible discrimination against patient unable to
pay for investigational drugs, since insurance companies rarely reimburse patients for investi-
gational treatments); Comments of Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n 9-10 (May 4, 1987) (FDA
Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, comment C00229) (FDA should protect patients from drugs
whose effectiveness is questionable); Letter from Ada Sue Selwitz, President, Applied Research
Ethics Nat'l Ass'n 2 (Apr. 17, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 9, comment C00113)
(questions ethics of selling unproven drugs to desperate patients); Letter from Sheila C.
Mitchell, M.D., Director, Medical Research Office, Baystate Medical Center, Springfield,
Mass. 2 (Apr. 29, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 10, comment C00197) (questions
the ethical basis of allowing desperately ill patients to exhaust their financial resources on
untested and potentially unsafe drugs); Letter from Nat'l Multiple Sclerosis Soc'y 2-3 (April
10, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 8, comment C00084) (Reproposal would allow
"profit-making" drug companies to shift development costs onto seriously ill individuals before
showing that the drug is safe and effective).
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House subcommittee and invited both the FDA and OMB.'65 Representa-
tive Weiss proposed to examine both the effect of the reproposed regulations
on the FDA's regulatory authority and the decisionmaking process which
led to the regulations.' 66 OMB not only declined the subcommittee's invita-
tion to attend the hearing,' 67 but also refused to produce several documents
regarding the decisionmaking process which the subcommittee staff had
requested. 1 68
The hearing focused on both the treatment use provision 69 and the sale
provision of the Reproposal.170 At the hearing, a former chief counsel of the
165. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 3. Representative Weiss chairs the Human Resources
and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Op-
erations. The subcommittee oversees FDA drug regulations.
166. Id. at 2-3.
167. Id. Wendy Gramm, OMB Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs,
declined the subcommittee's request to testify at the hearing because of a "conflicting engage-
ment." Id. at 145.
168. Id. at 3. The subcommittee sent OMB three letters requesting "all records-includ-
ing, but not necessarily limited to, notes, memoranda, correspondence, and drafts-written or
received by OMB personnel in any way related" to the Reproposal. Id. at 146, 147-48. OMB
responded one month after the first subcommittee letter and 15 days after the hearing, stating
that "[w]hile we have every desire to be responsive to the legitimate needs of Congress, none of
your three letters sent to OMB refers to any legal authority to support the proposition that the
OMB is compelled by law to produce internal documents of the type currently sought." Id. at
150. In fact, OMB did not produce all the requested documents until the subcommittee
threatened OMB with a subpoena. Off-the-record telephone interview with staff member of
House Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcom. (Nov. 19, 1987).
169. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 1-3 (testimony Rep. Weiss). One prominent re-
searcher warned that modern drugs are becoming increasingly more potent as a result of syn-
thesizing technologies and recombinant DNA. Id. at 37 (testimony of Dr. Charles G. Moertel,
Purvis and Roberta Tabor Professor of Oncology, Mayo Clinic and Mayo Medical School, and
Chairman, North Central Cancer Treatment Group). He cautioned that a disaster similar to
the Thalidomide disaster is more probable today than it was in 1962 and that the American
public would be exposed to the risk of a national tragedy if the proposed regulations were
implemented. Id. at 37.
Another distinguished researcher testified that the Reproposal would effectively prohibit the
FDA from denying a premature request for access to an investigational drug, precisely because
insufficient evidence would have been gathered on the drug's safety and effectiveness. Because
the regulations would place the burden of proving that a drug is not safe and effective on the
FDA, the FDA would be unable to deny access to a drug which had not been sufficiently
tested because the FDA would have no evidence to support its contention that the drug is not
safe or effective. Id. at 64-65 (testimony of Dr. Martin S. Hirsch, Infectious Disease Unit,
Dep't of Medicine, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, and Chair-
man, Steering Committee, AIDS Treatment Evaluation Program).
170. Id. at 1-3 (testimony Rep. Weiss). One respected researcher testified that because the
proposed regulations would allow patients to purchase promising investigational drugs, the
patient would have no incentive to enroll in a clinical trial where test subjects may be adminis-
tered a placebo rather than the active drug. Id. at 61 (testimony of Dr. Itzhak Brooks, Profes-
sor of Pediatrics and Surgery, Uniformed Services Univ. of the Health Sciences, and
Chairman, Anti-Infective Drugs Advisory Committee, FDA). Because it would be more desir-
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FDA testified on behalf of himself, three other former chief counsels and five
former commissioners of the FDA, that the reproposed regulations might
allow the marketing of worthless drugs to patients with life-threatening dis-
eases.' 7 ' The former chief counsel testified to his personal belief that the
regulations were not consistent with the language of the amended Act.
17 2
Four officials from the National Institutes of Health testified that a
number of its departments were not consulted on the language of the Repro-
posal and that as published, the regulations would adversely affect its ability
to continue AIDS research.
173
The present commissioner of the FDA, Frank Young, made a futile at-
tempt to justify the language of the reproposed regulations during the over-
sight hearing. 174 The correspondence that the subcommittee received from
the FDA, however, clearly shows that OMB rejected the Commissioner's
attempts to compromise and forced the FDA to accept OMB's language. 1
75
able to receive the drug outside a clinical trial, the researcher cautioned that the reproposed
regulations might create a situation in which wealthy patients would purchase the drug outside
of a clinical trial, thereby delegating the role of human test subject to those patients who could
not afford to purchase the drug. Id. This warning is supported by the fact that most insurance
companies will not reimburse patients for investigational drugs. See Letter from American
Medical Ass'n 6 (May 5, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, comment C00236);
Letter from Johns Hopkins Univ. 2 (May 5, 1987) (FDA Docket No. 82N-0394, vol. 11, com-
ment C00260); Letter from Health Insurance Ass'n of Am. 1 (Apr. 30, 1987) (FDA Docket
No. 82N-0394, vol. 10, comment C00203).
At the hearing, Congressman Weiss questioned the FDA's current general counsel on
whether the Reproposal's language allowing the sale of investigational drugs conflicted with
the language in the amended Act which prohibits drug companies from commercializing unap-
proved drugs. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 123. The general counsel did not believe that
the regulation conflicted with the amended Act. Id.
171. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 4. Richard M. Cooper, Chief Counsel of the FDA
from 1977-79 testified on behalf of himself and former Comm'r Charles Edwards, former
Comm'r Alexander Schmidt, former Comm'r Donald Kennedy, former Comm'r Jere Goyan,
former Comm'r Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr., former Chief Counsel Peter Barton Hutt, former
Chief Counsel Richard Merrill and former Chief Counsel Nancy Buc.
172. Id. at 13. In addition, William W. Goodrich, who served as chief counsel of the FDA
for nearly 20 years, sent written comments to the subcommittee strongly objecting to the
Reproposal. Id. at 15.
173. Dr. William F. Raub, Deputy Director, NIH; Dr. William Friedewald, Associate Di-
rector for Disease Prevention, Office of the Director, NIH; Dr. Maureen W. Myers, Chief,
AIDS Treatment Branch, National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases; and Dr.
Charles R. McCarthy, Office for Protection from Research Risks, Office of the Director, testi-
fied before the subcommittee. Id. at 16. Dr. McCarthy testified that within the health organi-
zations, an agency desiring to propose regulations which would affect another agency
customarily circulates the proposed regulations to those agencies. Id. Dr. McCarthy further
testified that the FDA did not circulate the Reproposal among any of the affected agencies. Id.
174. See id. at 66-73.
175. The Commissioner twice submitted revised language to OMB regarding the eviden-
tiary standard for FDA denial of treatment use of an investigational drug. See generally id. at
276-79 (copies of memoranda discussing proposed language). In fact, Commissioner Young
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The evidence suggests that OMB staff forced Commissioner Young to accept
OMB's proposed changes despite the commissioner's initial reservations and
against the better judgment of his staff176 and the associated medical re-
search community. 
177
After struggling with OMB for over a year,1 7' FDA Commissioner Young
relented and accepted OMB's language, despite the objections of the medical
community and the FDA staff. Commissioner Young instead decided to
insert restrictive language into the preamble to the regulations. 179 The Com-
missioner believed that restrictive language in the preamble would take pre-
cedence over less restrictive language in the regulation."° At the hearing,
however, a former FDA chief counsel testified that language in the regula-
tion controls language in the preamble.1 "1
Thus, the oversight hearing transcript reveals that after a year-long strug-
preferred to "essentially preserv[e] the status quo" on the investigational drug regulations. Id.
at 99. OMB rejected both of the Commissioner's drafts, complaining that the "FDA refuse[d]
to budge from its proposal." Id. Remarkably, Commissioner Young was unable to identify
the OMB staff person responsible for rejecting the FDA's version of the Reproposal. Id. at 97.
Congressman Weiss expressed concern that neither Congress nor the FDA could identify
"who in OMB made a major decision on health policy that overrode [FDA] recommendations,
even though [the FDA is] supposed to be in charge of making such decisions." Id.
176. In preparation for the hearing, the subcommittee staff learned that no one in the
Center for Drugs and Biologics, the FDA office responsible for monitoring the IND process,
was in support of the reproposed rule. Id. at 100. In addition, the current chief counsel of the
FDA warned Commissioner Young in November 1986 that the more far-reaching changes in
the Reproposal "could be challenged as inconsistent with existing statutory authority." Id. at
296; see also supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
177. Numerous directors from research departments at NIH were wary of the proposed
rule. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. In addition, three prominent medical re-
searchers testified about their concerns regarding the proposed rule. See supra notes 169-70.
178. The FDA transmitted the proposed IND Rewrite to OMB in July 1985. See supra
note 124. Memoranda submitted to the subcommittee show that the battle continued into
January 1987. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 272-79. The date of the final resolution is not
on record.
179. Commissioner Young testified that he was concerned about the language that OMB
sought regarding treatment use and sale of investigational drugs. Drug Hearing, supra note 65,
at 98-101. After OMB rejected several FDA versions of alternative language, see supra note
175, the Commissioner decided to accept strong language in the preamble in lieu of strong
language in the regulation, hoping that the preamble language would counterbalance OMB's
language in the reproposed rule. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 98-101.
180. See generally Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 100-12 (discussing weight to be ac-
corded preamble language). The Commissioner testified that by inserting interpretive lan-
guage into the preamble, he believed that he would have the ability to require sufficient data
from drug sponsors on which to make a determination of the safety and effectiveness of an
investigational drug. Id. at 112. The preamble to the reproposed rule states that the FDA
would base its decision to allow a request for an investigational drug on "sufficient informa-
tion" that the FDA expected would be provided. Preamble to Reproposal, supra note 65, at
8852.
181. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 13 (testimony of Richard M. Cooper, Esq.).
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gle with OMB over language in the proposed investigational drug regula-
tions, the FDA accepted OMB's version, opting to insert restrictive language
in the preamble."8 2 At the hearing, however, the FDA learned that the lan-
guage in a regulation prevails over language in the regulation's preamble,
and thus decided to redraft the Reproposal before publishing a final rule.
18 3
C. The Resolution: The Final Rule
The FDA published the final rule on May 22, 1987.184 In its final form
the rule strikes a compromise between the proposal and the Reproposal.
First, the FDA revised the provisions of the rule relating to sale. The FDA
changed the term describing drug pricing for investigational drugs distrib-
uted for treatment use from "sale" of a drug, which was used in the Repro-
posal,' 85 to "charging for" a drug.'8 6 The FDA wanted to make clear that
drug companies are authorized to recoup certain costs, 18 7 but are not al-
lowed to sell investigational drugs for a profit.18 8 In addition, the FDA
lengthened the reporting period before charging from ten to thirty days after
the FDA receives notice of the drug sponsor's intent to charge. 89 The regu-
lations also prohibit drug sponsors from charging for treatment use of an
investigational drug unless and until there is adequate enrollment in ongoing
clinical trials for that drug.' °
Second, the FDA clarified its intentions regarding the stage of the investi-
gational process at which the FDA will grant patient requests for investiga-
tional drugs. In the final rule, the FDA emphasized its intent to grant
desperately ill patients access to investigational drugs early in the investiga-
tional process.'91 The treatment use section of the final rule, however, indi-
cates that the FDA will grant access to investigational drugs later in the
182. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
183. Drug Hearing, supra note 65, at 13 (testimony of Richard M. Cooper, Esq.) Commis-
sioner Young testified that he believed he had sufficient authority under the preamble to deny
access to drugs which sponsors had not sufficiently tested. Id. at 112. He promised to recon-
sider whether the regulation authorized him to make decisions regarding the relative safety
and effectiveness of an investigational drug. Id. at 108. Commissioner Young testified: "I
thought I had that judgment, but if I don't have that judgment, then I've got to go back and
look at the rule." Id. at 112.
184. Final Rule, supra note 161, at 19,466.
185. Reproposal, supra note 65, at 8855.
186. 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d) (1988).
187. See Preamble to Final Rule, supra note 161, at 19,473.
188. Drug companies are specifically allowed to recover the "costs of manufacture, re-
search, development, and handling of the investigational drug." 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(3)
(1988).
189. Id. § 312.7(d)(2).
190. Id. § 312.7(d)(2)(i).
191. Section 312.34(a) states: "The purpose of this section is to facilitate the availability of
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investigational process than the Reproposal had indicated. The Reproposal
had stated that the FDA ordinarily would grant seriously ill patients access
after Phase 2 trials had been completed, or earlier if appropriate.1 92 The
final rule, however, states that seriously ill patients ordinarily may access
investigational drugs during Phase 3 trials or later. 193 While the final rule's
provision regarding access for patients with an immediately life-threatening
disease does not substantially differ from that of the Reproposal, the final
rule provides that such patients ordinarily may not access investigational
drugs until the drug enters Phase 2 trials.194
The major change in the treatment use section of the final rule is the stan-
dard that the FDA will employ in determining whether to grant patients
with an immediately life-threatening disease access to investigational drugs.
The final rule shifts back to the drug sponsor the burden of showing evidence
sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for granting access. 1" While the bur-
den on the sponsor under the final rule is lighter than the burden historically
imposed on drug sponsors, 96 the final rule relieves the FDA of the burden
of producing any evidence of the safety and efficacy of a drug.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF OMB's INVOLVEMENT IN THE
FDA's DRUG REGULATION
OMB's involvement in the FDA's promulgation of the investigational
drug regulations causes concern for several reasons. First, the substantive
changes which OMB compelled the FDA to accept in the Reproposal high-
light the insensitivity of OMB to historical FDA regulations and the judg-
ment of the FDA staff. Second, the changes demonstrate the ignorance of
promising new drugs to desperately ill patients as early in the drug development process as
possible, before general marketing begins .... " Id. § 312.34(a).
192. Reproposal, supra note 65, at 8856.
193. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (1988).
194. Id. § 312.34(a).
195. The regulations state that the FDA may deny access:
if the available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, fails to provide a reasonable basis
for concluding that the drug: (A) May be effective for its intended use in its intended
patient population; or (B) Would not expose the patients to whom the drug is to be
administered to an unreasonable and significant additional risk of illness or injury.
Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(i).
The final rule defined an "immediately life-threatening disease" as "a stage of a disease in
which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in
which premature death is likely without early treatment." Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(ii).
196. Historically, a drug sponsor seeking to release an investigational drug under a com-
passionate use exemption, had the burden of producing "sufficient evidence of the drug's safety
and effectiveness ... to justify its intended treatment use." See Preamble to Proposed IND
Rewrite, supra note 43, at 26,729. The compassionate use exemption was codified in the origi-
nal IND Rewrite proposal. Id. at 26,742.
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the non-expert OMB staff to fundamental principles of medical ethics.
Third, OMB's language in the Reproposal runs contrary to the amended
Act. Finally, the manner in which OMB conducted its review illuminates
the danger of allowing OMB to secretively coerce an agency to adopt regula-
tions which subvert the will of Congress.
Historically, FDA regulations have placed both the financial and the evi-
dentiary burden of proving the safety and effectiveness of a new drug on the
drug sponsor. 197 These two requirements have remained static since the
FDA first published investigational drug regulations twenty-five years ago.
OMB, pursuant to the President's deregulatory agenda, sought changes in
the investigational drug regulations which would shift the financial burden
of drug development onto the desperately ill patient"9 8 and the evidentiary
burden onto the FDA. 99 OMB imposed its changes on the FDA despite the
fact that not a single staff person within the FDA's Center for Drugs and
Biologics supported the Reproposal.2 °° Thus, OMB single-handedly forced
the FDA to adopt reproposed regulations which contravened both historical
FDA regulations and the judgment of an agency staff comprised of highly
qualified medical experts.
Second, the history of the investigational drug regulations demonstrates
OMB's ignorance of certain fundamental principles of medical ethics. The
politically appointed budget staff at OMB fashioned changes to the investi-
gational drug regulations which reflected the President's policy of deregula-
tion but which contravened ethical norms of medical research. Ethical
principles governing modern medical research dictate that researchers
should treat human test subjects with respect, justice and beneficence. 20'
The Reproposal conflicts with these principles.
The principle of respect requires society to protect those patients with di-
minished autonomy.2 2 Patients with life-threatening diseases are especially
vulnerable because they face imminent death and are desperate for a cure.2 °3
By allowing drug companies to sell typically expensive, unproven drugs; to
197. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 14345.
200. See supra note 176.
201. See supra text accompanying note 3.
202. See R. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 15-16. While society benefits from the data gained
from human research, the principle of respect requires society to give patients information
about alternative health care choices, honor those choices where possible, protect the privacy
rights of patients, and ensure that researchers are allowed to act in accordance with their
consciences or values. SUMMING Up, supra note 3, at 68.
203. See AIDS Hearing, supra note 46, at 7 (testimony of Paul Popham, AIDS patient).
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desperately ill patients, the Reproposal fails to adequately protect the auton-
omy of these patients.
The principle of justice requires society to distribute benefits and burdens
equally throughout society. 2" The Reproposal would have produced sev-
eral unjust results. First, it would have unjustly permitted society to reap
the benefit of medical research without incurring the cost of drug develop-
ment. Second, it would have imposed on the desperately ill patient the bur-
den of paying for an unproven treatment. Third, it would have
discriminated against those patients who are not independently wealthy
enough to afford the cost of the drug.20 5
The principle of beneficence requires drug sponsors to promote the well-
being of human test subjects.20 6 The Reproposal ran contrary to this princi-
ple in several ways. First, it would have forced the FDA to allow the distri-
bution of a drug on which it had insufficient evidence to determine whether
the drug was relatively safe or effective.207 Second, the risk of harm to the
patient, had the Reproposal been adopted, would have far outweighed any
unsubstantiated and speculative benefit. Third, by allowing the sale of inves-
tigational drugs, the risk of economic harm coupled with the physical risk to
the patient would have produced an unacceptable risk/benefit ratio.208
The history of the FDA's investigational drug regulations also demon-
204. See R. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 17. Justice dictates that researchers treat patients in a
fair and non-arbitrary manner. Society, as the prime beneficiary of drug research has tradi-
tionally incurred the cost of such research, by allowing pharmaceutical companies to recapture
development costs in the marketplace once the sponsor has received FDA approval to market
the drug. Insurance companies and health plans assist patients in paying for approved drug
treatment, thereby distributing the cost of such treatment equitably to society.
205. The Reproposal would have allowed society to shift the cost of drug development to
the patient involved in the research by authorizing drug companies to sell the drug to patients
while the drug is still in the investigational stage. Most insurance companies will not assist
patients in paying for drugs which have not been approved by the FDA. Thus, the patient
must personally finance the cost of treatment use of investigational drugs. See supra note 170.
While the final rule also allows drug companies to charge desperately ill patients for investi-
gational drugs, the language of the final rule does not produce results as unjust as does the
language in the Reproposal. The final rule places the burden of proving safety and effective-
ness on the drug company and allows the FDA discretion in determining whether to permit
the sale of an investigational drug. Therefore, the likelihood that an investigational drug will
be both effective and safe is much greater in the final rule.
206. Beneficence requires researchers to exercise great care, to make all decisions with the
aim of promoting the health of the individual patient, and to consider the welfare of others,
including future patients who may benefit from knowledge gained from research. SUMMING
Up, supra note 3, at 67.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
208. Id. See, e.g., AIDS Hearing, supra note 46, at 25 (testimony of Matilde Krim, Ph.D.,
Cochair of the American Foundation for AIDS Research). When research first began on the
drug AZT, the cost of supplying the drug to a single patient exceeded $10,000 per year.
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strates OMB's indifference to the will of Congress. In the amended Act,
Congress specifically directed the FDA to regulate investigational drugs.2'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that drugs intended to treat
deathly ill patients are not exempt from FDA regulations.210 Nonetheless,
OMB, motivated by a general bias against regulation,21' sought to curtail the
FDA's power to prohibit the distribution of investigational drugs.
Essentially, the OMB staff that reviewed the Reproposal contended that
medical doctors should have the right to prescribe investigational drugs to
desperately ill patients without the interference of the federal government.212
OMB staff failed to comprehend the difference between a physician's right to
practice medicine and an investigator's right to conduct research. 21 3
Whereas the FDA does not have the authority to regulate the former, Con-
gress has expressly mandated the FDA to regulate the latter.214 The
amended Act directs the FDA to regulate the distribution and use of investi-
gational drugs in order to protect the rights and welfare of patients.21 5
Aware of the FDA staff's concern that the language in the Reproposal con-
flicted with the language in the amended Act,21 6 0MB nonetheless com-
pelled the FDA to publish the Reproposal.
Perhaps the greatest danger to the regulatory process is illuminated by the
procedures that OMB chose to review the FDA's investigational drug rules.
The tactics employed by OMB during its review illustrate how OMB has
209. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
210. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). In Rutherford, Justice Marshall
wrote:
Nothing in the history of the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which first estab-
lished procedures for review of drug safety, or of the 1962 Amendment, which added
the current safety and effectiveness standards.. .suggests that Congress intended pro-
tection only for persons suffering from curable diseases. To the contrary, in delibera-
tions preceding the 1938 Act, Congress expressed concern that individuals with fatal
illnesses, such as cancer, should be shielded from fraudulent cures.
Id. at 553; see also supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
211. See supra note 66.
212. See supra text accompanying note 67.
213. Robert Levine, Professor of Medicine at Yale University, defines research as "a class
of activities designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge," whereas practice is
"a class of activities designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or cli-
ent." R. LEVINE, supra note 3, at 3.
214. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
215. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1982).
216. FDA Commissioner Frank Young fought with OMB over the language in the Repro-
posal for over a year. See supra text accompanying note 178. Commissioner Young was aware
of the agency staff's concerns about the rule. See supra note 176. Although no public record
exists which summarizes the discussions between Commissioner Young and OMB, Commis-
sioner Young testified that he expressed his concerns to OMB. See Drug Hearing, supra note
65, at 98.
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transformed the national regulatory process into a coercive and secretive op-
eration. Setting its sights on the FDA's investigational drug regulations,
OMB fashioned language which it forced the FDA to accept.217 Moreover,
OMB's entire review process was shrouded in secrecy. Because OMB re-
fused to submit its comments to the FDA in writing, produce documents to
a congressional oversight subcommittee, or answer legislators' questions re-
garding its involvement in the formulation of the FDA regulations, OMB
remains largely unaccountable for its role in the FDA's rulemaking process.
Neither the preamble to the Reproposal nor the preamble to the final rule
indicates OMB's involvement in the redrafting of the regulations. The pre-
ambles merely indicate that the FDA sent the proposal and Reproposal to
OMB, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act, for review of the FDA's
compliance with the recordkeeping and reporting requirements.218 In fact,
the single document which details OMB's involvement in the formulation of
the investigational drug regulations is the transcript of the congressional
oversight hearing.2'9 Had Representative Weiss not had the foresight to
summon FDA Commissioner Young before the subcommittee to detail
OMB's involvement in the Reproposal, the FDA may have published the
Reproposal as a final rule and the public would have had no indication of
OMB's influence in formulating the FDA's investigational drug regulations.
OMB's attempt to secretly compel the FDA to adopt final regulations sub-
stantially easing restrictions on investigational drugs demonstrates the dan-
ger of allowing a small non-expert staff to set national drug policy. Society
takes great risks by allowing a politically appointed budget staff to single-
handedly force the FDA to adopt drug regulations which run contrary to
historical agency regulations, fundamental ethical norms, the better judg-
ment of the expert agency staff, and the agency's congressional mandate.
Not only does society risk subverting the will of Congress by allowing OMB
to fashion regulations contrary to the FDA's enabling act, but it runs a
greater risk of restricting the FDA's authority to stop drug manufacturers
from distributing unsafe drugs to desperate patients. 220
217. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
218. See Preamble to Final IND Rewrite, supra note 68, at 8855; Preamble to Final Rule,
supra note 161, at 19,476.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
220. These risks are more than hypothetical possibilities. In fact, a recent report indicates
that the executive branch, undeterred by critics of OMB's role in the investigational drug
regulations, currently has plans to further revise the drug approval process. See The Sun,
(Baltimore, Md.) Aug. 7, 1988, at 3A, col. 4. The administration's plans include lowering the
standard for approval of drugs intended for life-threatening diseases. A staff person of the Vice
President's deregulatory task force explained: "We want to vary the regulatory hurdles de-
pending on the seriousness of the disease. Maybe you should lower your standards if you're
dealing with a disease that's certain to result in death." Id.
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Moreover, because OMB reviews all administrative agency rules, OMB's
heavy-handed review procedures threaten the entire federal regulatory pro-
cess. The secretive, coercive tactics employed by OMB during its review of
the investigational drug regulations have become standard operating proce-
dure at 0MB,22'1 undermining fundamental principles of agency rulemaking.
First, OMB, operating in a secretive manner, refuses to allow public partici-
pation in the formulation of rules which affect public rights. Second, be-
cause OMB imposes its regulatory program on administrative agencies,
agency rules may be the product of a small staff of OMB budget experts
rather than the result of reasoned decisionmaking through public participa-
tion. Ultimately, regulations formulated in a vacuum by a small staff which
is unaccountable to the public will not reflect the larger societal values which
ought to shape federal regulatory policy. Thus, the history of the FDA's
investigational drug regulations. illustrates not only the danger of allowing
OMB to regulate national drug policy, but also the peril of permitting OMB
to undermine public participation and reasoned decisionmaking in the fed-
eral regulatory arena.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of the FDA's investigational drug regulations illustrates
OMB's recent attempts to control the national regulatory arena. Heeding
the President's deregulatory agenda, OMB sought changes in the FDA's in-
vestigational drug regulations which ran contrary to both historical FDA
drug regulations and established principles of medical ethics. Moreover,
OMB ignored the mandate of Congress that drug manufacturers prove the
safety and effectiveness of a new drug before receiving FDA approval to
distribute it. Despite a year-long struggle over the language in the rule,
OMB prevailed and the FDA published the Reproposal.
OMB's involvement in the formulation of the investigational drug regula-
tions remained obscure until Congress, at an oversight hearing, exposed
OMB's role in secretly coercing the FDA to repropose changes to the regula-
tions. As a result of the oversight hearing, the FDA commissioner revised
the Reproposal and subsequently published modified regulations. The secre-
tive manner in which OMB chose to review the FDA's proposed regulations,
however, highlights the danger of permitting a small budget staff to formu-
late national regulatory policy, regardless of whether the agency, Congress,
or the public supports the rule. By permitting OMB staff to isolate itself
from the public and to conduct its regulatory review process in secret, soci-
ety tacitly approves the formulation of rules which are indifferent to basic
221. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
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societal values. Although the final FDA investigational drug rule substan-
tially retreats from OMB's version, the history of the rule demonstrates the
danger of allowing OMB to regulate the regulators.
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